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Kiobel,	  Subject	  Matter	  Jurisdiction,	  and	  the	  Alien	  
Tort	  Statute	  
Anthony	  J.	  Bellia	  Jr.†	  &	  Bradford	  R.	  Clark††	  
The	  Supreme	  Court	   is	   currently	   reviewing	   the	  Second	  Circuit’s	  decision	   in	   Kiobel	   v.	   Royal	   Dutch	   Petroleum,	   a	   case	   holding	   that	  federal	  courts	   lack	   jurisdiction	  under	  the	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute	  (“ATS”)	  over	  claims	  against	  corporations.1	  	  Although	  the	  parties	  have	  focused	  on	   issues	   of	   corporate	   liability	   under	   the	   ATS,	   there	   is	   a	   logically	  antecedent	   question	   of	   subject	   matter	   jurisdiction	   that	   the	   Court	  should	   decide	   before	   considering	   corporate	   liability.	   	   All	   of	   the	  parties	   in	   Kiobel—whether	   corporate	   or	   individual—are	   aliens.	  	  Understood	   in	   its	   full	   legal	   and	   historical	   context,	   the	   ATS	   was	   a	  jurisdictional	   statute	   that	  did	  not	   apply	   to	   suits	  between	  aliens.	   	   In	  
Sosa	  v.	  Alvarez-­‐Machain,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   sought	   to	   interpret	   the	  ATS	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  First	  Congress.2	  	  If	  the	  Court	   adheres	   to	   this	   goal	   in	  Kiobel,	   then	   it	   should	   conclude	   that	   it	  lacks	  statutory	  subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  over	  the	  case.	  This	   understanding	   of	   the	   ATS	   avoids	   the	   substantial	  constitutional	   question	   that	   would	   arise	   under	   Article	   III	   if	   ATS	  jurisdiction	  were	  interpreted	  to	  reach	  suits	  between	  aliens.	  	  Because	  all	   of	   the	   parties	   in	   Kiobel	   are	   aliens,	   subject	   matter	   jurisdiction	  under	   Article	   III	   must	   rest	   on	   something	   other	   than	   diversity	   of	  citizenship.	   	   (Article	   III	   diversity	   jurisdiction	   extends	   the	   federal	  judicial	   power	   to	   suits	   between	   an	   alien	   and	   a	   U.S.	   citizen,	   not	   to	  suits	  between	  aliens.3)	  	  Because	  the	  case	  does	  not	  involve	  admiralty,	  ambassadors,	   states,	   or	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   only	   potential	  candidate	   is	   federal	   question	   jurisdiction	   pursuant	   to	   the	   Arising	  Under	  Clause.	   	   There	   are	   several	   impediments,	   however,	   to	   finding	  such	  jurisdiction.	  	  In	  Sosa,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  held	  that	  “the	  ATS	  is	  a	  jurisdictional	  statute	  creating	  no	  new	  causes	  of	  action.”4	  	  Because	  the	  ATS	  “is	  in	  terms	  only	  jurisdictional,”5	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  conclude	  that	   cases	   brought	   under	   the	   statute	   arise	   under	   the	   Constitution,	  laws,	  or	  treaties	  of	  the	  United	  States	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  III.	  	  At	   a	   minimum,	   reading	   the	   ATS	   to	   confer	   jurisdiction	   over	   suits	  between	   aliens	   would	   raise	   substantial	   constitutional	   questions	  under	   Article	   III.	   	   These	   questions	   can	   be	   avoided,	   however,	   by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   †	   Professor	  of	  Law	  and	  Notre	  Dame	  Presidential	  Fellow,	  Notre	  Dame	  Law	  School.	  	   ††	   William	   Cranch	   Research	   Professor	   of	   Law,	   The	   George	   Washington	   University	  Law	  School.	  	  	   1	   621	  F.3d	  111	  (2d	  Cir.	  2010).	  	   2	   542	  U.S.	  692	  (2004).	  	   3	   “The	   judicial	   Power	   shall	   extend	   .	   .	   .	   to	   Controversies	   .	   .	   .	   between	   a	   State,	   or	   the	  Citizens	  thereof,	  and	  foreign	  States,	  Citizens	  or	  Subjects.”	  	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art	  III,	  §	  2.	  	   4	   542	  U.S.	  at	  724.	  	   5	   Id.	  at	  712.	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2	  	  
reading	  the	  statute	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  original	  understanding	  to	  restrict	  federal	  jurisdiction	  to	  suits	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	  citizens.6	  As	  enacted	  in	  1789,	  the	  ATS	  provided	  that	  “the	  district	  courts	  .	  .	  .	  shall	   [	  ]	   have	   cognizance,	   concurrent	  with	   the	   courts	   of	   the	   several	  States,	  or	   the	  circuit	  courts,	  as	   the	  case	  may	  be,	  of	  all	  causes	  where	  an	   alien	   sues	   for	   a	   tort	   only	   in	   violation	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   or	   a	  treaty	  of	  the	  United	  States.”7	  	  The	  statute	  identifies	  the	  plaintiff	  as	  an	  alien,	  but	  does	  not	  specify	  the	  nationality	  of	  the	  defendant.	  	  Nor	  does	  the	  statute	  specify	  the	  meaning	  of	  “a	  tort	  only	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	   nations.”	   	   In	   1980,	   lower	   federal	   courts	   began	   the	   practice	   of	  reading	   the	   ATS	   expansively	   to	   allow	   foreign	   citizens	   to	   sue	   other	  foreign	  citizens	  for	  violations	  of	  modern	  customary	  international	  law	  that	  occurred	  outside	  the	  United	  States.8	  	  In	  Sosa,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  took	  a	  more	  restrictive	  approach.	  	  Without	  addressing	  the	  propriety	  of	   the	   party	   alignment	   or	   subject	   matter	   jurisdiction,	   the	   Court	  rejected	  a	  claim	  by	  a	  Mexican	  citizen	  suing	  another	  Mexican	  citizen	  as	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   ATS.	   	   Specifically,	   the	   Court	   concluded	  that	   Jose	   Francisco	   Sosa’s	   claim	   for	   arbitrary	   detention	   did	   not	  constitute	  a	  tort	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	   the	   statute.	   	   Although	   the	   Court	   interpreted	   the	   statute	   to	   leave	  the	   door	   “open	   to	   a	   narrow	   class	   of	   international	   norms	   [existing]	  today,”9	  it	   stressed	   the	   need	   for	   “judicial	   caution	  when	   considering	  the	  kinds	  of	  individual	  claims	  that	  might	  implement	  the	  jurisdiction	  conferred	   by	   the	   early	   statute.”10	  	   According	   to	   the	   Court,	   the	   ATS	  should	   be	   interpreted	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   views	   of	   the	   First	  Congress.	  Under	  this	  approach,	  “federal	  courts	  should	  not	  recognize	  private	   claims	   under	   federal	   common	   law	   for	   violations	   of	   any	  international	   law	   norm	   with	   less	   definite	   content	   and	   acceptance	  among	  civilized	  nations	  than	  the	  historical	  paradigms	  familiar	  when	  [the	  ATS]	  was	  enacted.”11	  Neither	  the	  broader	  approach	  initially	  endorsed	  by	  lower	  federal	  courts	   nor	   the	   more	   restrictive	   approach	   subsequently	   adopted	   by	  
Sosa	  fully	  captures	  the	  original	  meaning	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  ATS.	  	  The	  ATS,	  understood	  in	  historical	  context,	  was	  meant	  to	  cover	  a	  narrower	  set	  of	  party	  alignments	  than	  those	  allowed	  by	  lower	  federal	  courts	  but	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  torts	  than	  those	  identified	  in	  Sosa.	   	  Read	  in	  light	  of	  Article	   III,	   the	   common	   law	   forms	   of	   action	   applicable	   to	   intentional	  torts	  against	  aliens,	  and	  the	  background	  law	  of	  nations	  principles	  that	  informed	   the	   statute,	   the	  ATS	   is	   best	   read	   to	   have	   restricted	   suits	   to	  those	   against	   U.S.	   citizens	   but	   to	   have	   allowed	   aliens	   to	   sue	   for	   any	  intentional	   tort	   involving	   force	   against	   their	   person	   or	   personal	  property.	   	   At	   the	   time,	   only	   such	   “torts”	   committed	   by	   U.S.	   citizens	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   6	   Our	   analysis	   of	   the	  ATS	   in	   this	   Essay	   is	   drawn	   substantially	   from	  our	   recent	   article	  discussing	   the	   history	   of	   the	   statute	   in	   much	   greater	   detail.	   	   See	   Anthony	   J.	   Bellia	   Jr.	   and	  Bradford	  R.	  Clark,	  The	  Alien	  Tort	  Statute	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  Nations,	  78	  U.	  Chi.	  L.	  Rev.	  445	  (2011).	  	   7	   Judiciary	  Act	  of	  1789	  §	  9,	  1	  Stat.	  73,	  76–77,	  codified	  as	  amended	  at	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1350.	  	   8	   See,	  e.g.,	  Filartiga	  v	  Pena-­‐Irala,	  630	  F.2d	  876,	  878	  (2d	  Cir.	  1980).	  	   9	   542	  U.S.	  at	  729.	  	   10	   Id.	  at	  725–28.	  	   11	   Id.	  at	  732.	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against	   aliens	   would	   have	   been	   understood	   to	   violate	   “the	   law	   of	  nations.”	  	  	  In	  1789,	  every	  nation	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  redress	  certain	  violations	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  committed	  by	  its	  citizens	  or	  subjects	  against	  other	  nations	   or	   their	   citizens.	   Such	   violations	   included	   interfering	   with	  the	  rights	  of	  ambassadors,	  violating	  safe	  conducts,	  impairing	  neutral	  use	   of	   the	   high	   seas,	   and	   committing	   intentional	   torts	   against	   the	  citizens	   of	   another	   nation.	   	   If	   a	   nation	   failed	   to	   redress	   such	  violations,	  then	  it	  became	  responsible	  to	  the	  other	  nation	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  and	  gave	  the	  other	  nation	  just	  cause	  for	  war.	  	  The	  First	  Congress	   was	   undoubtedly	   aware	   of	   these	   principles	   and	   enacted	  several	  statutory	  provisions—including	  the	  ATS—in	  order	  to	  comply	  with	   the	   United	   States’	   obligations	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   to	  redress	  violations	  by	  its	  citizens.	  	  This	  context	  helps	  to	  illuminate	  the	  original	  meaning	  and	  purpose	  of	  the	  ATS.	  In	  1789,	   the	  United	  States	  was	  a	  weak	  nation	  seeking	   to	  avoid	  conflict	   with	   foreign	   nations.	   	   The	   Constitution	   was	   designed	   to	  enhance	   the	   United	   States’	   ability	   to	   comply	   with	   its	   various	  obligations	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations—and	  thus	  prevent	  conflict	  with	  other	  nations.	  	  For	  example,	  Article	  I	  gave	  Congress	  power	  to	  define	  and	  punish	  offenses	  against	  the	  law	  of	  nations.12	  	  The	  First	  Congress	  exercised	   this	   power	   to	   enact	   important	   federal	   criminal	  prohibitions	   designed	   to	   deter	   and	   punish	   certain	   violations	   of	   the	  law	  of	  nations,	  including	  violations	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  ambassadors	  and	  violations	  of	  safe	  conducts.	  	  In	  addition,	  Article	  III	  authorized	  federal	  court	   jurisdiction	   over	   a	   variety	   of	   civil	   cases	   implicating	   the	   law	   of	  nations	  and	  U.S.	  foreign	  relations,	  including	  admiralty	  disputes,	  cases	  affecting	   ambassadors,	   and	   controversies	   between	   foreign	   citizens	  and	   citizens	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   	   The	   Judiciary	   Act	   of	   1789	  implemented	   this	   jurisdiction	   by	   authorizing	   federal	   courts	   to	   hear	  suits	   by	   ambassadors,	   admiralty	   and	   maritime	   disputes,	   and	  controversies	   between	   aliens	   and	   U.S.	   citizens.	   	   Within	   the	   last	  category,	  the	  Act	  gave	  federal	  circuit	  courts	  general	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction	  (with	  a	  $500	  amount	  in	  controversy	  requirement)	  and—by	   virtue	   of	   the	  ATS—federal	   district	   courts	   jurisdiction	   over	   alien	  claims	  “for	  a	  tort	  only	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  or	  a	  treaty	  of	  the	   United	   States”	   (with	   no	   amount	   in	   controversy	   requirement).	  	  Without	   the	   ATS,	   the	   amount	   in	   controversy	   requirement	   would	  have	   prevented	   federal	   courts	   from	   hearing	   most	   claims	   for	  intentional	   torts	   committed	   by	   U.S.	   citizens	   against	   aliens.	   	   Such	  torts,	  however,	   constituted	  violations	  of	   the	   law	  of	  nations	   that	   the	  United	   States	   had	   an	   obligation	   to	   redress.	   	   Thus,	   by	   enacting	   the	  ATS,	   the	   First	   Congress	   enabled	   the	   United	   States	   to	   remedy	   an	  important	   category	   of	   law	   of	   nations	   violations	   committed	   by	   U.S.	  citizens	  against	  aliens.	  	  Although	  the	  practice	  has	  been	  largely	  forgotten	  today,	  a	  nation	  became	   responsible	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   for	   injuries	   that	   its	  citizens	  inflicted	  on	  aliens	  if	  it	  failed	  to	  provide	  an	  adequate	  means	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   12	   U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  10.	  
4	  	  
redress—by	   punishing	   the	   wrongdoer	   criminally,	   extraditing	   the	  offender	   to	   the	  aggrieved	  nation,	  or	   imposing	  civil	   liability.	   	  Failure	  to	   redress	  such	   injuries	   in	  one	  of	   these	  ways	  gave	   the	  alien’s	  home	  nation	  just	  cause	  for	  war.	  	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  War,	  members	  of	  Congress	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  they	  could	  rely	  upon	  states	  to	   redress	   injuries	   suffered	   by	   British	   subjects	   at	   the	   hands	   of	  Americans.	   	  To	  ensure	   that	   the	  United	  States	  would	  not	   violate	   the	  law	   of	   nations,	   the	   First	   Congress	   enacted	   both	   criminal	   and	   civil	  statutes	   to	   redress	   harms	   inflicted	   by	   U.S.	   citizens	   against	   aliens.	  	  Because	  early	  federal	  criminal	  jurisdiction	  did	  not	  clearly	  encompass	  all	   such	  harms,	   the	  ATS	  operated	   as	   a	   fail-­‐safe	   provision.	   	   The	  ATS	  gave	  British	  subjects	  (and	  all	  other	  aliens)	  a	  right	  to	  sue	  Americans	  in	   federal	   court	   for	   torts	   that,	   if	   not	   redressed	   through	   a	   civil	   or	  criminal	   action,	   would	   render	   the	   United	   States	   responsible	   for	   its	  citizens’	  violations	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations.	  	  By	  authorizing	  civil	  redress	  under	   the	   ATS,	   the	   United	   States	   simultaneously	   signaled	   to	   other	  nations	  its	  intent	  to	  comply	  fully	  with	  its	  obligations	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  and	  established	  a	   self-­‐executing	  means	  of	   avoiding	  military	  reprisals	  for	  the	  misconduct	  of	  its	  citizens.	  	  The	  First	  Congress	  did	  not	  have	  the	  same	  incentives	  to	  authorize	  the	   adjudication	  of	   tort	   suits	  between	  aliens	   in	   federal	   court.	   	   In	   this	  regard,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  analyze	  suits	  between	  aliens	  based	  on	  where	  the	  tort	  occurred.	  	  First,	  consider	  violence	  between	  aliens	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	   United	   States.	   	   Unlike	   violence	   against	   aliens	   by	   U.S.	   citizens,	  violence	  by	  aliens	  against	  other	  aliens	  was	  not	  directly	  imputed	  to	  the	  United	   States	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   if	   the	   United	   States	   failed	   to	  redress	  it.	  	  Under	  the	  law	  of	  nations,	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  have	  the	  same	  obligation	  to	  redress	  such	  violence	  as	  it	  did	  to	  redress	  violence	  by	  US	  citizens.	  	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  such	  alien–alien	  violence	  occurred	  with	  any	  frequency	  in	  the	  1780s.	  	  If	  suits	  of	  this	  kind	  arose,	  moreover,	  state	  courts	  were	  available	  to	  hear	  them.	  	  There	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  evidence	  that	  states	  failed	  to	  adjudicate	  such	  suits	  fairly	  (unlike	  suits	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	  citizens).	   	  Accordingly,	  even	  assuming	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  an	  obligation	  to	  redress	  violence	  in	  its	  territory	  by	  one	  alien	  against	  another,	  redress	  in	  state	  court	  would	  have	  satisfied	  that	  obligation.	  	  Absent	  evidence	  that	  such	  claims	  arose	  frequently	  or	  that	   state	   courts	   failed	   to	   adjudicate	   them	   fairly,	   Congress	   had	   no	  obvious	  reason	  to	  assign	  them	  to	  federal	  courts.	  	  Had	  it	  wished	  to	  do	  so,	   moreover,	   it	   could	   not	   have	   relied	   on	   foreign	   diversity	  jurisdiction.	   	   Rather,	   it	   would	   have	   had	   to	   employ	   “arising	   under”	  jurisdiction	  by	  creating	  a	  federal	  cause	  of	  action.	  Second,	   consider	   violence	   between	   aliens	   that	   occurred	   in	  foreign	   nations	   (a	   routine	   scenario	   in	  modern	  ATS	   cases,	   including	  
Kiobel).	   	   The	   law	   of	   nations	   imposed	   no	   obligation	   on	   the	   United	  States	   to	   provide	   aliens	   with	   a	   forum	   for	   adjudicating	   such	   claims	  against	  one	  another.	   	  Thus,	   failure	   to	   adjudicate	   such	   claims	  would	  not	  have	  subjected	  the	  United	  States	  to	  reprisals	  by	  foreign	  nations.	  	  Indeed,	  at	  the	  time	  the	  ATS	  was	  adopted,	  adjudication	  of	  such	  claims	  arguably	   would	   have	   infringed	   upon	   the	   territorial	   sovereignty	   of	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foreign	  nations	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations.	  	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  the	  First	  Congress	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  authorize—and	  good	  reason	  to	  exclude—suits	  between	  aliens	   in	   federal	   court	   for	  acts	  occurring	   in	  other	  nations.	  The	   limited	   nature	   of	   federal	   judicial	   power	   under	   the	  Constitution	   also	   suggests	   that	   the	   ATS	   was	   meant	   to	   encompass	  only	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	   U.S.	   citizens.	   	   Article	  III	   extends	   the	  judicial	   power	   to	   only	   nine	   categories	   of	   cases	   and	   controversies.	  	  The	   first	   three	   categories	   are	   defined	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   subject	  matter	  of	  the	  case.	  	  The	  last	  six	  categories	  are	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  the	   identities	  of	   the	  parties.	   	  Suits	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	  citizens	   fall	  within	  diversity	  jurisdiction	  over	  controversies	  “between	  a	  State,	  or	  the	   Citizens	   thereof,	   and	   foreign	   States,	   Citizens	   or	   Subjects.”13	  	   By	  contrast,	   suits	   by	   aliens	   against	   other	   aliens	   do	   not	   fall	   within	  Article	  III’s	   diversity	   jurisdiction.	   	   Thus,	   to	   uphold	   jurisdiction	  over	  such	   suits,	   one	   would	   have	   to	   conclude	   that	   they	   constitute	   cases	  “arising	  under	   this	  Constitution,	   the	  Laws	  of	   the	  United	  States,	   and	  Treaties	  made,	  or	  which	  shall	  be	  made,	  under	   their	  Authority.”14	  	  At	  the	   time	   the	   ATS	   was	   enacted,	   however,	   there	   was	   no	   “federal	  common	   law.”	   	   Rather,	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   was	   understood	   to	   be	  general	   law.	   15 	  	   After	   the	   Constitution	   was	   ratified	   and	   the	   ATS	  enacted,	   judges	   and	   other	   public	   officials	   sharply	   debated	  whether	  federal	   courts	   had	   power	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   their	   Article	   III	  jurisdiction	   to	   adopt	   and	   apply	   a	   municipal	   common	   law	   of	   the	  United	   States	   (including	   those	   parts	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations	  incorporated	   by	   the	   common	   law).	   	   Ultimately,	   this	   question	   was	  resolved	   in	   1812	   when	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   decided	   that	   the	  constitutional	   structure	   precludes	   federal	   courts	   from	   unilaterally	  recognizing	  and	  applying	  common	  law	  crimes	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  For	   these	   reasons,	   the	   First	   Congress	   would	   not	   have	  understood	  an	  alien	  claim	  “for	  a	   tort	  only	   in	  violation	  of	   the	   law	  of	  nations”	   to	   arise	   under	   the	   Constitution,	   Laws,	   and	   Treaties	   of	   the	  United	   States.	   	   Moreover,	   although	   scholars	   continue	   to	   debate	  aspects	   of	  Sosa’s	   precise	   holding,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   affirmed,	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   historical	   understanding,	   that	   “the	  ATS	   is	   a	   jurisdictional	  statute	   creating	   no	   new	   causes	   of	   action.”16	  	   On	   this	   understanding,	  the	  statute	  merely	  gave	  aliens	  a	  federal	  forum	  to	  adjudicate	  common	  law	  claims	  for	  law	  of	  nations	  violations	  that	  happened	  to	  fall	  within	  Article	   III	   jurisdiction,	   such	   as	   controversies	   between	   a	   citizen	   or	  subject	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  and	  a	  citizen	  of	  an	  American	  state.	  	  The	  ATS	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   13	   U.S.	  CONST.	  	  art.	  III,	  §	  2,	  cl.	  1.	  	   14	   Id.	  	   15	   Of	  course,	  Congress	  could	  enact	  a	  federal	  cause	  of	  action	  between	  aliens	  for	  particular	  international	   law	  violations,	   as	   it	   did	   in	   the	  Torture	  Victim	  Protection	  Act	   of	   1991,	   and	   give	  federal	   courts	   “arising	   under”	   jurisdiction	   over	   such	   claims.	   	   The	   First	   Congress,	   however,	  would	   not	   have	   understood	   the	   ATS	   to	   create	   a	   federal	   cause	   of	   action	   or	   to	   confer	   subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  on	  federal	  courts	  over	  claims	  between	  aliens.	  	   16	   542	  U.S.	  at	  724.	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did	  not	  create	  an	   independent	  cause	  of	  action	  arising	  under	   federal	  law.	  	  These	   considerations	   suggest	   that	   the	   ATS	   was	   originally	  enacted	   to	   enable	   the	   United	   States	   to	   remedy	   a	   specific,	   but	  important,	   law	   of	   nations	   violation—the	   intentional	   infliction	   of	  harm	   by	   a	   U.S.	   citizen	   upon	   the	   person	   or	   personal	   property	   of	   an	  alien.	  	  In	  the	  parlance	  of	  the	  time,	  such	  harms	  constituted	  “torts”	  “in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations.”	  	  Understanding	  the	  ATS	  as	  one	  of	  the	  means	   employed	   by	   the	   First	   Congress	   to	   fulfill	   the	   United	   States’	  duties	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  Constitution’s	  allocation	   of	   powers	   to	   conduct	   war	   and	   foreign	   relations.	  	  Historically,	   this	  allocation	  of	  powers	  has	   led	   the	  Supreme	  Court	   to	  read	   federal	  statutes	   to	  avoid	  conflict	  with	   foreign	  nations	  absent	  a	  clear	   indication	   from	   the	   political	   branches	   that	   they	   intended	   to	  initiate	   such	   conflict.	   	   The	   Supreme	   Court	   famously	   endorsed	   this	  approach	   in	   Murray	   v	   Schooner	   Charming	   Betsy, 17 	  and	   the	   same	  constitutional	  concerns	  animate	  the	  Court’s	  adherence	  to	  traditional	  sovereignty-­‐respecting	   rules	   like	   the	   act	   of	   state	   doctrine.	   	   By	  understanding	   the	   ATS	   as	   a	   means	   of	   satisfying	   the	   United	   States’	  obligations	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations,	   courts	   would	   avoid	   usurping	  the	  constitutional	  prerogatives	  of	  the	  political	  branches.	  Courts	   and	   scholars	   have	   advanced	   various	   claims	   about	   the	  ATS,	  but	  none	  has	  fully	  recovered	  the	  original	  meaning	  of	  the	  statute	  in	  its	  historical	  context.	  	  Some	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  ATS	  was	   originally	   understood	   to	   authorize	   federal	   court	   jurisdiction	  over	  all	  alien	   tort	  claims	   for	   law	  of	  nations	  violations,	   regardless	  of	  the	  citizenship	  of	  the	  parties.	   	  These	  theories	  are	  too	  broad	  because	  they	   not	   only	   fail	   to	   account	   for	   the	   jurisdictional	   limitations	   of	  Article	   III	   but	   also	   contradict	   important	   principles	   of	   the	   law	   of	  nations,	  which	   the	   ATS	  was	  meant	   to	   uphold.	   	   Others	   have	   argued	  that	   the	   ATS	   was	   intended	   to	   give	   federal	   courts	   jurisdiction	   over	  only	  particular	  kinds	  of	  paradigmatic	   law	  of	  nations	  violations—for	  example,	   violations	   of	   safe	   conducts	   or	   certain	   kinds	   of	   admiralty	  torts.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  itself	  has	  concluded	  that	  the	  ATS	  encompasses	   only	   a	   narrow	   class	   of	   international	   torts	   closely	  analogous	   to	   the	   three	   international	   crimes	   recognized	   by	  Blackstone.18	  	   These	   theories	   are	   too	   narrow	   because	   they	   do	   not	  include	   certain	   basic	   tort	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	   Americans	   that	  members	   of	   the	   Founding	   generation	   would	   have	   understood	   the	  ATS	   to	   encompass	   in	   order	   to	   satisfy	   the	   United	   States’	   basic	  obligations	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations.	   	   Still	   other	   scholars	   have	  contended	  that	  history	  reveals	  interpretive	  presumptions	  that	  courts	  should	  apply	  to	  the	  ATS,	  including	  a	  presumption	  that	  courts	  should	  interpret	   the	  ATS	  expansively	   in	   favor	  of	  alien-­‐alien	  claims	  because	  the	  Founders	   aspired	   to	   give	   the	   law	  of	   nations	  broad	   effect	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   17	   6	  U.S.	  (2	  Cranch)	  64,	  118	  (1804).	  	   18	   Sosa,	  542	  U.S.	  at	  724–25.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  these	  categories	  consisted	  of	  “torts	  corresponding	  to	  Blackstone’s	  three	  primary	  offenses	  [against	  the	  law	  of	  nations]:	  violation	  of	  safe	  conducts,	  infringement	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  ambassadors,	  and	  piracy.”	  	  Id.	  at	  724.	  See	  WILLIAM	  BLACKSTONE,	  4	  COMMENTARIES	  ON	  THE	  LAWS	  OF	  ENGLAND	  *68.	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United	   States.	   	   These	   theories,	   however,	   are	   anachronistic.	   	   Had	  courts	   interpreted	   the	   ATS	   too	   broadly	   in	   1789,	   they	   could	   have	  violated	   distinct	   principles	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations	   recognizing	   the	  territorial	   sovereignty	   of	   independent	   states.	   	   	   Even	   today,	  adjudication	   of	   suits	   between	   aliens	   arising	   abroad	   risks	   friction	  with	  other	  nations.	  In	   1789,	   the	   most	   natural	   way	   to	   read	   the	   ATS,	   given	   its	   full	  legal	  and	  historical	  context,	  was	  as	  a	  grant	  of	   jurisdiction	  to	   federal	  district	   courts	   to	   hear	   common	   law	   tort	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	  United	   States	   citizens	   who	   used	   force	   to	   injure	   the	   person	   or	  personal	   property	   of	   an	   alien.	   	   Contrary	   to	   some	   anachronistic	  modern	   theories,	   the	   ATS	   did	   not	   recognize	   such	   tort	   claims	   as	   a	  matter	  of	  “federal	  common	  law.”	   	  True	  federal	  common	  law	  did	  not	  emerge	   until	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   	   The	   First	   Congress	   expected	  federal	  courts	  exercising	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  ATS	  to	  employ	  state	  common	  law	  forms	  of	  action	  under	  the	  Process	  Act	  and	  to	  apply	  any	  other	   governing	   state	   rules	  of	  decision	  under	   the	  Rules	  of	  Decision	  Act.	   	   By	   authorizing	   such	   adjudication	   in	   federal	   court,	   the	   ATS	  prevented	   the	  United	  States	   from	  becoming	  responsible	   for	  wrongs	  committed	  by	  its	  citizens	  against	  aliens.	  	  In	  light	  of	  this	  background,	  the	  ATS	  is	  best	  understood	  as	  a	  self-­‐executing,	  fail-­‐safe	  measure	  that	  prevented	  giving	  other	  nations	  just	  cause	  for	  war	  or	  reprisals	  against	  the	   United	   States	   based	   on	   the	   misconduct	   of	   its	   citizens	   against	  aliens.	   	  Extending	  the	  ATS	  to	  suits	  between	  aliens	  would	  have	  been	  not	   only	   unnecessary,	   but	   counterproductive	   and	   probably	  unconstitutional.	   	   The	  United	  States	  was	  not	   responsible	   for	  harms	  inflicted	   by	   one	   alien	   against	   another,	   and	   it	   had	   no	   obligation	   to	  remedy	   harms	   inflicted	   abroad	   by	   one	   alien	   on	   another.	   	   To	   the	  contrary,	   adjudicating	   such	   claims	  might	  have	  been	   regarded	   as	   an	  interference	  with	  the	  territorial	  sovereignty	  of	  other	  nations—itself	  a	   violation	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations.	   	   Moreover,	   giving	   federal	   courts	  such	   jurisdiction	   (without	   creating	   a	   new	   federal	   cause	   of	   action)	  would	  have	  exceeded	  the	  limits	  of	  Article	  III.	   	  Thus,	  interpreting	  the	  ATS	   to	   confer	   jurisdiction	   only	   over	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	   U.S.	  citizens	  is	  not	  only	  the	  most	  plausible	  reading	  of	  the	  statute,	  but	  the	  only	   reading	   that	   both	   prevents	   friction	   with	   other	   nations	   and	  avoids	  serious	  constitutional	  questions	  under	  Article	  III.	  Although	   Sosa	   involved	   a	   suit	   between	  Mexican	   nationals,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  did	  not	  consider	  or	  decide	  whether	  the	  ATS	  confers	  jurisdiction	  over	   suits	   between	  aliens,	   or	  whether	   such	   jurisdiction	  would	  violate	  Article	  III.	  	  First,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  Alvarez	  had	  not	   alleged	   a	   tort	   “in	   violation	   of	   the	   law	   of	   nations”	   within	   the	  meaning	  of	   the	  statute.	   	  Given	   this	   statutory	  holding,	   the	  Court	  had	  no	   need	   to	   consider	   either	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   the	   party	  alignment	   under	   the	   ATS	   or	   the	   constitutional	   issue	   that	   such	   an	  alignment	   would	   have	   raised.	   	   Second,	   as	   originally	   filed,	   Sosa	  included	   U.S.	   defendants.	   	   Accordingly,	   the	   district	   court	   had	   an	  independent	   constitutional	   and	   statutory	   basis	   for	   subject	   matter	  jurisdiction	  over	  Alvarez’s	   original	   claims	   against	   the	  United	   States	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(based	  on	  the	  FTCA)19	  and	  over	  Alvarez’s	  claims	  against	  the	  U.S.	  DEA	  agents	   (based	   on	   diversity	   of	   citizenship).20	  	   Because	   Alvarez’s	   tort	  claims	  against	  Sosa,	   the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  DEA	  agents	  all	  arose	  from	   a	   common	   nucleus	   of	   operative	   fact,	   the	   claims	   originally	  formed	  part	  of	  a	   single	  constitutional	   “case”	   for	  purposes	  of	  Article	  III. 21 	  	   It	   follows	   that	   the	   federal	   courts—including	   the	   Supreme	  Court—had	  Article	  III	  power	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  case	  even	  after	  the	  US	  defendants	  were	  dismissed.	   	  Accordingly,	  Sosa	  did	  not	  present	  (and	  the	  Court	  did	  not	  decide)	  the	  questions	  whether	  the	  ATS	  and	  Article	  III	  permit	  federal	  courts	  to	  adjudicate	  claims	  solely	  between	  aliens.22	  	  Indeed,	  the	  Court	  has	  made	  clear	  that	  its	  opinions	  cannot	  be	  read	  to	  decide	  questions	  of	  subject-­‐matter	  jurisdiction	  sub	  silentio.	  
Kiobel	  squarely	  presents	  these	  unanswered	  questions	  of	  subject	  matter	   jurisdiction.	   	  The	  plaintiffs	  and	  the	  defendants	  are	  all	  aliens.	  	  No	  U.S.	  citizens	  or	  corporations	  have	  ever	  been	  parties	  to	  the	  case.	  	  If	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  ATS	  confers	  jurisdiction	  only	  over	  suits	  by	   aliens	   against	   US	   citizens,	   then	   the	   Court	   could	   avoid	   both	   the	  Article	   III	   and	   the	   corporate	   liability	   issues.	   	   Because	   the	   party-­‐alignment	   issue	   under	   the	   ATS	   is	   a	   question	   of	   subject	   matter	  jurisdiction,	  it	  cannot	  be	  waived	  by	  the	  parties	  and	  may	  be	  raised	  at	  any	  time	  in	  the	  proceedings	  by	  the	  parties	  or	  the	  court.	  	  Thus,	  before	  the	  Court	  considers	  corporate	  liability	  under	  the	  ATS,	  logic	  suggests	  that	   it	   should	   decide	   first	   whether	   the	   ATS	   even	   applies	   to	   suits	  between	  aliens.	  If	   the	   Court	   decides	   that	   the	   ATS	   does	   not	   apply	   to	   suits	  between	  aliens,	  then	  it	  will	   likely	  never	  have	  occasion	  to	  decide	  the	  thorny	   question	   of	   corporate	   liability	   under	   the	   ATS.	   	   Under	   the	  express	   terms	   of	   28	   U.S.C.	   §1332,	   federal	   courts	   already	   have	  jurisdiction	   over	   suits	   by	   aliens	   against	   U.S.	   corporations	   provided	  that	  the	  amount	  in	  controversy	  is	  greater	  than	  $75,000.00.	  	  Although	  the	   diversity	   statute	   (like	   the	   ATS)	   was	   silent	   as	   to	   corporate	  citizenship	  when	  originally	  enacted	  in	  1789,	  Congress	  subsequently	  amended	   the	  diversity	   statute	   to	  provide	   that	  U.S.	   corporations	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   19	   See	   28	   U.S.C.	   §	  1346(b)(1)	   (granting	   district	   courts	   exclusive	   jurisdiction	   over	   “civil	  actions	  on	  claims	  against	  the	  United	  States”	  for	  wrongs	  caused	  by	  wrongful	  or	  negligent	  acts	  of	  federal	  employees	  acting	  in	  the	  course	  of	  their	  duties).	  	   20	   See	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1332(a)(2)	  (granting	  jurisdiction	  over	  suits	  between	  “citizens	  of	  a	  State	  and	  citizens	  or	  subjects	  of	  a	  foreign	  state”).	  	   21	   See	  United	  Mine	  Workers	  of	  America	  v	  Gibbs,	  383	  U.S.	  715,	  725	  (1966).	  	   22	   See	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1367(a)	  (granting	  supplemental	  jurisdiction	  over	  cases	  that	  form	  part	  of	  “the	  same	  case	  or	  controversy”).	  	  Nor	  did	  the	  Court	  conclude	  that	  Alvarez’s	  ATS	  claim	  arose	  under	  the	  Constitution,	  laws,	  and	  treaties	  of	  the	  United	  States	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  III.	  	  The	   Court	   repeatedly	   stressed	   that	   the	  ATS	   is	   purely	   a	   jurisdictional	   statute	   that	   creates	   no	  federal	  cause	  of	  action.	  	  See	  Sosa,	  542	  US	  at	  724.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Court	  rejected	  Justice	  Scalia’s	  assertion	  that	  “a	  federal-­‐common-­‐law	  cause	  of	  action	  of	  the	  sort	  the	  Court	  reserves	  discretion	  to	  create	  would	  ‘arise	  under’	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  not	  only	  for	  purposes	  of	  Article	  III	  but	   also	   for	   purposes	   of	   statutory	   federal-­‐question	   jurisdiction.”	   	   Id.	   at	   745	   n	   *	   (Scalia	  concurring	   in	  part	  and	  concurring	   in	   the	   judgment).	   	  According	   to	   the	  Court,	   its	  position	  did	  not	   imply	   that	   “the	   grant	   of	   federal-­‐question	   jurisdiction	   would	   be	   equally	   as	   good	   for	   our	  purposes	  as	  §	  1350.”	  	  Id.	  at	  731	  n.19	  (majority).	  	  Indeed,	  the	  Court	  acknowledged	  that	  although	  its	   holding	   was	   “consistent	   with	   the	   division	   of	   responsibilities	   between	   federal	   and	   state	  courts	  after	  Erie,	  .	  .	  .	  a	  more	  expansive	  common	  law	  power	  related	  to	  28	  U.S.C.	  §	  1331	  might	  not	  be.”	  	  Id.	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citizens	   of	   their	   state	   of	   incorporation	   and	   the	   state	   in	  which	   they	  have	   their	   principal	   place	   of	   business.	   	   Thus,	   aliens	  would	   have	   to	  rely	  on	   the	  ATS	   for	   jurisdiction	  only	   in	   the	  unlikely	  event	   that	   they	  were	   suing	   a	   U.S.	   corporation	   for	   less	   than	   the	   $75,000	   amount	   in	  controversy	   requirement.	   	   Because	   the	   ATS	   is	   jurisdictional,	   little	  turns	   on	  whether	   an	   alien	   sues	   a	   U.S.	   corporation	   in	   federal	   court	  under	  the	  ATS	  or	  the	  diversity	  statute.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  enactment,	  ATS	   jurisdiction	   was	   understood	   to	   encompass	   intentional	   acts	   of	  violence	   by	   U.S.	   citizens	   against	   aliens.	   	   In	   1789,	   the	   Process	   Act	  required	   federal	   courts	   exercising	   either	   ATS	   jurisdiction	   (with	   no	  amount	  in	  controversy	  requirement)	  or	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction	  (with	   a	   $500	   amount	   in	   controversy	   requirement)	   to	   employ	   the	  common	  law	  forms	  of	  action	  used	  by	  the	  states	  in	  adjudicating	  such	  tort	   claims.	   	   Section	   34	   of	   the	   Judiciary	   Act	   of	   1789	   (the	   Rules	   of	  Decision	  Act)	  additionally	  required	  federal	  courts	  to	  apply	  any	  other	  applicable	  state	  rules	  of	  decision.	  	  Following	  Erie	  and	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  action	  by	  the	  Federal	  Rules	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  there	  are	  at	  least	  three	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  might	  try	  to	  apply	  the	  ATS	  in	  light	   of	   its	   original	  meaning.	   	   Under	   any	   alternative,	   federal	   courts	  should	  use	  the	  same	  rules	  of	  decision	  to	  adjudicate	  a	  tort	  claim	  by	  an	  alien	  against	  a	  U.S.	  citizen	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  claim	  is	  brought	  under	  ATS	  or	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction.	  First,	  the	  Court	  might	  regard	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  ATS	  to	  be	  all	  but	   obsolete	   because	   vanishingly	   few	   torts	   committed	   by	   U.S.	  citizens	  against	  aliens	  now	  violate	  the	  law	  of	  nations,	  and	  such	  torts	  are	   no	   longer	   attributable	   to	   the	   United	   States	   if	   not	   redressed.	  	  (Failure	  to	  provide	  aliens	  with	  fair	  access	  to	  court	  could	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  denial	   of	   justice	   claim,	   but	   such	   claims	   are	   not	   addressed	   by	   the	  ATS.)	   	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   ATS	   gives	   federal	   courts	  jurisdiction	  over	  a	  set	  of	  cases	  that	  no	  longer	  exist.	  	  Even	  under	  this	  interpretation,	   however,	   aliens	   who	   suffer	   intentional	   injuries	   to	  person	  or	  personal	  property	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  U.S.	  citizens	  still	  would	  have	  recourse	  in	  federal	  court.	  	  Rather	  than	  invoke	  ATS	  jurisdiction,	  the	  alien	  would	  have	  to	  employ	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction,	  where	  there	  is	  an	  amount	  in	  controversy	  requirement	  but	  express	  statutory	  authority	  to	  name	  U.S.	  corporations	  as	  defendants.	  Second,	   the	   Court	  might	   interpret	   the	   ATS	   to	   continue	   to	   give	  federal	  courts	   jurisdiction	   to	  hear	  claims	   involving	   intentional	   torts	  of	   violence	   by	   U.S.	   citizens	   against	   aliens	   because	   these	   are	   the	  claims	   that	   the	   ATS	   originally	   encompassed.	   	   Under	   this	   approach,	  courts	  would	  essentially	  treat	  the	  relevant	  statutory	  text—“tort	  only	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	  nations”—as	  a	  term	  of	  art	  or	  shorthand	  that	  referred	  to	  suits	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	  citizens	  for	  intentional	  harms	  to	  an	  alien’s	  person	  or	  personal	  property.	  	  Under	  this	  interpretation,	  federal	  courts	  would	  apply	  the	  same	  law	  in	  ATS	  cases	  as	  they	  would	  apply	   in	   foreign	   diversity	   jurisdiction—that	   is,	   federal	   procedural	  rules	  and	  the	  state	  or	  foreign	  substantive	  law	  applicable	  under	  state	  conflicts	   rules.	   	   Again,	   as	   the	   ATS	   was	   originally	   understood,	  municipal	   (i.e.	   domestic)	   law	   provided	   the	   rule	   of	   decision	   in	   ATS	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cases.	   	  The	  “tort”	  the	  ATS	  encompassed	  was	  “in	  violation	  of	  the	  law	  of	   nations”	   not	   because	   international	   law	   created	   a	   liability	   in	   one	  person	  to	  another	  for	  a	  tort	  injury,	  but	  rather	  because	  the	  offender’s	  nation	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  tort	  under	  the	  law	  of	  nations	  if	  it	  failed	   to	   redress	   it	   under	   domestic	   law.	   	   Accordingly,	   in	   1789	   the	  same	  municipal	  law	  would	  apply	  whether	  a	  tort	  was	  brought	  in	  ATS	  jurisdiction	  or	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction.	  	  The	  same	  would	  be	  true	  today.	  	  Under	  this	  alternative,	  the	  same	  law	  would	  apply	  whether	  the	  case	  was	  brought	   in	  ATS	  or	   foreign	  diversity	   jurisdiction.	   	  The	  only	  difference	  would	  be	  the	  amount	  in	  controversy	  requirement	  and	  the	  diversity	   statute’s	   explicit	   instructions	   to	   treat	   corporations	   as	  citizens	  of	  certain	  states.	  	  Third,	   the	  Court	  might	  perpetuate	   the	  erroneous	   suggestion	   in	  
Sosa	   that	   the	   First	   Congress	   understood	   the	   ATS	   to	   encompass	   a	  limited	  category	  of	  tort	  liabilities	  that	  international	  law	  itself	  creates.	  	  Even	  under	   this	   interpretation,	   the	  same	   law	  should	  apply	  whether	  the	  alien	  brings	  the	  “international	  tort”	  claim	  in	  foreign	  diversity	  or	  ATS	   jurisdiction.	   	   If	   some	   tort	   liabilities	   created	   by	   customary	  international	   law	   qualify	   as	   federal	   common	   law	   causes	   of	   action,	  they	   should	   be	   cognizable	   in	   either	   ATS	   or	   foreign	   diversity	  jurisdiction	  if	  brought	  by	  an	  alien	  against	  a	  U.S.	  citizen.	  	  If	  brought	  in	  foreign	   diversity	   jurisdiction,	   there	   would	   no	   issue	   of	   corporate	  liability	   under	   the	   ATS.	   	   Regardless	   of	   Sosa’s	   error	   in	   this	   regard,	  however,	   state	   or	   foreign	   law	  more	   likely	  would	   supply	   the	   rule	   of	  decision	  in	  a	  tort	  claim	  brought	  by	  an	  alien	  against	  a	  U.S.	  citizen.	  	  No	  matter	   the	   rule	   of	   decision	   in	   a	   foreign	   diversity	   case,	   the	   ATS	  corporate	  liability	  issue	  would	  not	  arise.	  	  	  Kiobel	   also	   raises	   the	   question	   whether	   ATS	   jurisdiction	  applies	   to	   torts	  committed	  outside	   the	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  United	   States.	   	   In	   our	   view,	   the	   First	   Congress	   would	   have	  understood	  foreign	  diversity	  and	  ATS	  jurisdiction	  to	  extend	  to	  claims	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	  citizens	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  claim	  arose	  within	  the	  territorial	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  1789,	  it	  was	  well	   established	   that	   an	   alien	   could	   bring	   a	   tort	   or	   contract	   claim	  arising	   in	   one	   nation	   in	   the	   courts	   of	   the	   defendant’s	   home	   nation	  because	   such	   actions	  were	   “transitory,”	   not	   “local.”23	  	   The	   principle	  underlying	   transitory	   actions	  was	   that	   the	   cause	  of	   action	   followed	  the	   defendant	   from	   one	   jurisdiction	   to	   another.	   	   Courts	   did	   not	  hesitate	  to	  exercise	  jurisdiction	  over	  such	  actions	  unless	  the	  plaintiff	  and	  defendant	  were	  both	  aliens.	  24	  	  	  Courts	  exercised	  jurisdiction	  over	  transitory	   actions	   because	   the	   cause	   of	   action	   was	   understood	   to	  follow	   the	   defendant	   into	   the	   court’s	   jurisdiction.	   	   It	   is	  uncontroversial	   that	   federal	   courts	   may	   exercise	   foreign	   diversity	  jurisdiction	   over	   tort	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	   U.S.	   citizens	   for	   acts	  occurring	   outside	   the	   United	   States.	   	   It	   should	   be	   no	   more	  controversial	   for	   federal	   courts	   to	   exercise	   ATS	   jurisdiction	   over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   23	   See	  Bellia	  &	  Clark,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  469.	  	  See	  generally	  Printz	  v.	  United	  States,	  521	  U.S.	  898	  (1997)	  (describing	  transitory	  causes	  of	  action).	  	   24	   Bellia	  &	  Clark,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  482-­‐83.	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intentional	   tort	   claims	   by	   aliens	   against	   U.S.	   citizens	   for	   acts	  occurring	  outside	  the	  United	  States.	  	  If	  the	  amount	  in	  controversy	  in	  such	  an	  ATS	  suit	  exceeds	  $75,000,	  the	  alien	  may	  also	  bring	  the	  claim	  in	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction.	  If	   the	   Court	   does	   not	   address	   the	   antecedent	   jurisdictional	  question	   in	   Kiobel	   of	   whether	   the	   ATS	   extends	   to	   claims	   between	  aliens,	  the	  question	  will	  remain	  open	  in	  pending	  cases	  and	  the	  Court	  will	   likely	   face	   it	   in	   a	   future	   case	   as	   judges	   and	   litigants	   begin	   to	  address	   it	  explicitly.	   	  For	  example,	   in	  Sarei	  v.	  Rio	  Tinto,25	  an	  en	  banc	  panel	  of	   the	  Ninth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	   recently	  divided	  on	   this	  jurisdictional	   question.	   	   Judge	   Ikuta—in	   a	   dissent	   joined	   by	   Judges	  Kleinfeld,	  Callahan,	  and	  Bea—argued	  that	  federal	  courts	  lack	  subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  ATS	  over	  claims	  between	  aliens.	  	  Judge	  Ikuta	   concluded	   that	   Sosa	   had	   not	   resolved	   this	   question	   because	  there	   the	  Court	  had	  supplemental	   jurisdiction	  over	   the	  claim	  under	  the	  ATS.	  	  Furthermore,	  she	  explained,	  the	  Court	  could	  not	  resolve	  the	  jurisdictional	  question	  sub	  silentio.	  	  Finally,	  she	  observed	  that	  federal	  courts	   have	   an	   obligation	   to	   consider	   their	   subject	   matter	  jurisdiction	   at	   any	   stage	   of	   the	   proceeding,	   whether	   or	   not	   the	  parties	  have	  raised	  it.	   	  Similarly,	   in	  Mwani	  v.	  United	  States,26	  pending	  in	   U.S.	   District	   Court	   for	   the	  District	   of	   Columbia,	  Magistrate	   Judge	  Facciola	   recently	   stayed	   all	   proceedings	   in	   an	   ATS	   case	   between	  aliens	   to	   await,	   among	   other	   things,	   whether	   Kiobel	   addresses	   the	  antecedent	   jurisdictional	   question	   whether	   the	   ATS	   extends	   to	  claims	   between	   aliens.	   	   If	   the	   Court	   declines	   to	   address	   this	  jurisdictional	   question	   on	   the	   current	   certiorari	   petition	   in	   Kiobel,	  the	   question	   may	   persist	   in	   Kiobel	   itself	   in	   further	   proceedings.	  	  Were	   the	   Kiobel	   Court	   to	   proceed	   directly	   to	   determine	   that	  corporations	  may	   be	   liable	   in	   ATS	   cases	   and	   remand	   the	   case,	   the	  jurisdictional	  question	  would	  remain	  open	  on	  remand	  in	  the	  Second	  Circuit.	  As	   originally	   understood,	   the	   ATS	   provided	   a	   particularly	  important	  species	  of	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction—jurisdiction	  over	  claims	  by	  aliens	  against	  U.S.	   citizens	   for	   intentional	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	   person	  or	  personal	   property.27	  	   	   In	   1789,	   the	   First	   Congress	  would	   have	   understood	   the	   importance	   of	   giving	   federal	   courts	  jurisdiction	   over	   such	   cases	   without	   regard	   to	   the	   amount	   in	  controversy	   because	   of	   their	   importance	   under	   the	   law	   of	   nations.	  	  Today,	  most	   such	   claims	  will	   seek	  more	   than	   $75,000	   in	   damages,	  and	  thus	  will	  fall	  within	  the	  federal	  courts’	  uncontroversial	  diversity	  jurisdiction.	  	  Because	  foreign	  diversity	  jurisdiction	  and	  the	  municipal	  rules	   of	   decision	   that	   generally	   apply	   in	   such	   cases	   unremarkably	  extend	  to	  corporations,	  the	  Court	  likely	  will	  never	  have	  to	  decide	  the	  ATS	   corporate	   liability	   question	   if	   it	   instead	   addresses	   the	  antecedent	  jurisdictional	  question	  in	  Kiobel	  whether	  the	  ATS	  extends	  to	  actions	  between	  aliens.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   25	   Nos.	  02–56256,	  02–56390,	  09–56381,	  2011	  WL	  5041927	  (9th	  Cir.	  Oct.	  25,	  2011).	  	   26	   No.	  99-­‐125	  (D.	  D.C.	  	  Jan.	  10,	  2012)	  (order	  staying	  proceedings).	  	   27	   Bellia	  &	  Clark,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  524-­‐25.	  
